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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a nation that has persisted through turbulent 
times. The country’s leaders have long attempted to balance the allocation of resources between 
a strong military and a developing economy in their quest for stability, peace and prosperity. 
This paper examines the relationship between Jordan’s military expenditure and economic 
growth during the period 1970-2015 to shed further light.  Using cointegration techniques 
allowing for structural breaks based on Gregory and Hansen (1996), and the ARDL 
methodology this paper tests the short and long-run equilibrium relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth in Jordan. Furthermore, with the error correction model 
(ECM) and CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests, we examine the stability of the above relationship. 
The results show that there is a positive, long-run and short run relationship between military 
expenditure and economic growth in Jordan during the period under study. This finding has 
important policy implication to the Jordanian state as it justifies that the transfer of resources 
to the military has not negatively impacted economic growth. 
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To date, there exists little consensus as to the nature of the relationship between military 
spending and economic growth. Since Benoit’s (1978) seminal paper which supports the 
positive relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in Less Developing 
Countries (LCD hereafter), dozens other empirical studies published that approach the milex-
growth nexus from different theoretical, methodological perspectives and/or different periods. 
The prior literature suggests three main strands: a positive relationship (e.g. Dixon and Moon 
1986; among others) mainly due to creation of positive externalities (e.g. developed 
infrastructure, peace and a secure climate for investment, to name a few); a negative (e.g. Deger 
and Smith 1983; Gyimah-Brempong 1989; among others) mainly due to misallocation of 
resources; and there is also a number of papers that reported that there is no clear relationship 
between milex and economic growth (e.g. Biswas and Ram 1986; Hess 1989; Alexander 1990; 
among others).  
Nevertheless, even though armed conflicts declined the last decades, many countries continue 
to spend on defence tackled by either external threats: e.g. to pledge nuclear, chemical, 
radiological and biological weapons accumulated by their rivals (Aizenman and Glick 2006) 
or internal threats (e.g. various political groups that often engage in acts of terrorism and/or 
militancy) (Collier and Hoeffler 2007). 
Jordan, a small and developing country in the M. East, stands among the heavy military1 
spenders for several decades, as is located in a persistently troubled area where LDC achieved 
a sustainable balance between defence and prosperity (Hassan and Al -Saci 2004). As Jordan 
attempts to balance security and economic progress, it is crucial to understand how a 
geopolitically important country cope in the recent decades. Research on Jordan focuses mainly 
 
1 According to CIA (2015), Jordan was among the 12 highest military spenders’ countries compared to the world 
as per 2015 as in % GDP (4.31% of GDP). 
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on multi-country, cross-section analysis suggesting that milex hinders economic growth, whilst 
the actual relationship vary across countries. As such, a more in-depth analysis of case studies 
is crucial, mainly for policy purposes and decision-making (Antonakis and Apostolou 2003). 
Consequently, the present study  is of particular value, since, firstly it is among the few studies 
that explores the milex -economic growth nexus on Jordan over a longer period, to the best of 
our knowledge, and with a methodology that includes testing for the short and long run 
equilibrium relationship; secondly, given the country’s unique attributes, a detailed study of 
the effects of milex on the Jordanian economic growth will make an important contribution to 
the literature and provide valuable guidance for policy makers. Finally, Jordan is selected for 
this study because of the role that the government2 has played in its economic development. 
Given the issues raised above, this paper explores the short and long run effects of military 
spending on economic growth in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan between 1970 and 2015. 
First, the Gregory-Hansen (GH hereafter) (1996) cointegration technique, allowing for the 
presence of an unknown potential structural break in the data, is applied, supporting the 
existence of at least one cointegration relation in the presence of single structural breaks in the 
system. By applying the above, we find that most of the endogenously determined structural 
breaks coincide with the gradual effects of the 1989 financial crisis on the Jordanian economy3. 
Considering the resulting endogenously determined structural breaks, the error correction 
version and the ARDL procedure is then employed, to specify the short- and long-term effects 
of milex on economic growth in the presence of structural breaks. Based on the empirical 
findings obtained, we conclude that military expenditure promotes economic growth in the 
country under study. Our findings are of particular importance considering the changes to the 
 
2 The Jordanian government follows a state market continuum model ‘based along fine continua: contribution to 
the economy; insolvent in planning; institutional development; support for the private sector; and government 
ownership of productive assets’ Knowles (2005: 43). 
3 Potential structural breaks can undermine the existence of long run relationship between GDP and milex. (e.g.  
the structural weaknesses in the Jordanian economy during the 80s that led to the financial crisis of 1988-89). 
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regional and global security environment with security concerns as an integral component (Al-
Hamdi and Alawin 2017). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a short overview 
of the military economic growth nexus in Jordan. Section 3 provides a short review of the 
existing literature. Section 4 contains the empirical specification and discusses the data. Section 
5 includes the econometric methodology and discusses the empirical results while the final 
section, 6, concludes the study.  
 
The Growth- Military Nexus in Jordan 
Jordan is a small, rather mixed economy4, which is characterised by a variety of private 
freedoms, a lack of natural resources (and 92% of its land is semi-arid), limited industrial base, 
high human capital and especially an exposure to external shocks (Metz 1989). Up to date, the 
government plays a large economic role both in development planning and as a financier. 
Jordan’s small size and lack of major economic resources made it dependent also on aid from 
Western and various other sources (e.g. US military aid since 1957 and external inflows of 
private capital: particularly through workers remittances and transfers) (IMF 2012).  
The Jordanian economy experienced also periods of economic turbulence since the 70’s due to 
both internal and external factors. Jordan’s social and economic welfare have been tied to its 
relations with neighbouring Arab countries in terms of population movements and flows of 
trade and finance. Half of the country’s exports and a quarter of imports were with 
neighbouring Arab states. The Jordanian economic growth in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s 
was mainly driven by the private sector construction underpinned by worker remittances 
 
4 That supported further from the Economic Freedom Index (2018) with an average score of 66% from 1995-2019 
(the countries with score from 60% -70% considered as moderately free). Also, the average value for 
governmental spending for Jordan during 1970-2015 was 24.03% of GDP (own data). According to Chobanov 
and Mladenova (2009:9) ‘the optimal government size (total government spending as a share of GDP) is between 
17% and 40% of GDP’. 
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(considered foreign assistance and rents) earned by Jordanian oil laborers5 working in Arab oil 
countries and public infrastructure projects that allowed the government to pay generous 
subsidies to a broad swath of its population (Brynen 1992). At the same time Jordan was 
recovering from the effects of the 1967s Israeli war and adjusting to costs consisting in loss of 
territory and influx of refugees (Abdul-Khaliq et al. 2013). 
The Iran -Iraq war (started in September 1980) initially boosted the Jordanian economy (e.g. 
soft loans of US$189,2mil and grands of US$58.3mil) and also exports to Iraq of many 
industrial products. The continuation, though of the Iran -Iraq war created problems (economic 
assistance for Iraq dried out and Iraq was deeply in debt to Jordan). Additionally, the claim of 
sovereignty over the West Bank led to a capital outflow of US$250 mil. From 1983 -1988 the 
government followed expansionary policies based on external borrowing and running down 
reserves (reserves of the Central Bank fell in 1989 to US$68 million). Hence, the mid- 1980’s 
saw a decline in oil prices which caused aid and remittances to dry up; the lack of this external 
funding impacted the economy and economic growth declined (Abdul-Khaliq et al. 2013). This 
periodic external and domestic unrest, (dismembered by the 1967 Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank and short civil war in 1970 and nation-wide riots in 1989, high debt) endured an 
economic catastrophe that cost Jordan a large part of infrastructure, resources, and manpower 
(Salibi 1998). Current account and budget deficits enlarged: by 1989, total public debt had 
reached US$9.5 billion, and the country could no longer service her foreign debt obligations, 
driving the country into the financial crisis of 1988-89 (Knowles 2005). Therefore, Jordan had 
no choice but to resort to IMF and World Bank’s financial support in order to reschedule its 
foreign debt. Whilst the period of adjustment led to an increased economic openness and a 
stronger market-orientation, the state remained the main actor to form economic policies. 
 
5 Almost one third of the country’s labor force was working in the Gulf, remitting an annual average of US$ 918 




Furthermore, and due to the 1988-89 financial crisis and the 1991 Gulf War, economic growth 
turned negative in the period 1988-1991, averaging -2%. Growth returned with the structural 
adjustment reforms of the 1990’s (5.5% for the period 1992- 1998) but slowed slightly late in 
the decade (2.9% of GDP for the period 1996-1999) due to falling oil prices and persistent 
economic rigidities (Abdul-Khaliq et al. 2013). The economy began to shine in the early to 
middle 2000’s (4.4% for the period 2000-2002 to 8.2% in 2007) mainly due to expansionary 
monetary policies and payoffs from a decade of reforms. However, in the late 2000’s, growth 
was hit hard by the onset of the global economic crisis (growth rate of Jordan GDP reached to 
7.2% and 5.5% and 2.3% for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively) (Jaradat 2010).   
No less prominent, on Jordan’s political and economic landscape is the state military 
expenditure. Jordan’s high military burden is driven primarily by regional security concerns6. 
Jordan shares borders with Israel, Syria, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and has traditionally maintained 
a large military to address periodic hostilities with neighbours and conflicts in the wider 
region7. Jordan is a high militarised nation along with Israel, Singapore, Syria and Russia 
(BICC 2012) as seen in Table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
Additionally, Jordan’s maintenance of a large standing army may act as a salve for high 
unemployment (Tarawnah 2012). The Jordanian Armed Forces consists of 100,500 active 
personnel along with 65,000 reserve personnel8 (IISS 2010). This combined force represents 
2.6% of the total population of 6.5 million (CIA 2013) and has one soldier for every 65 citizens, 
(the highest ratio among the Arab countries). Its military personnel are more numerous than 
 
6 See Yildirim et al. (2005) for a discussion on the changes in military balances in Middle Eastern countries. 
7 See and Al-Hamdi and Alawin (2017) for reasons behind peaceful changes and developments between Jordan 
and its neighbours. Also, see Chen et al. (1996) for a detailed discussion regarding the collective action problem 
and increases in milex for countries neighbouring Israel and motives for Jordan’s involvement in the Israeli’s 
wars.   
8 Those employed by the military and security agencies and their families, have also medical insurance and, get 
assistance with their housing, education and social security. Additionally, thousands of physicians, engineers, 
computer technicians and others were trained by the military. Thus, military expenditure helps not only the 
security but the national economy as well (The Jordan Times, 2012). 
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France's, with population almost eight times larger. A large amount of the country’s military 
expenditure goes directly to supporting this pool of labour: in 1997 it was estimated that 85% 
of national military expenditure went to manpower costs (Government of Jordan 2013). In 
1999, 20.6% of total government expenditure was spent on education, while military spending 
constituted 23.7% of total government expenditure in the same year (World Bank 2013).  
However, the Jordanian military earns rent by sending its officers to Gulf Arab countries where 
salaries are higher than in Jordan, (by offsetting the funds that went to defence budget (Droz-
Vincent 2006). Interestingly, though, from 1988 to 2002 milex (as % of GDP) fell from 10.7% 
to 3.0% (mainly due to the peace agreements with Israel- -Oslo Accords in 1993, Washington 
Declaration in ’94 and replacement of the Israeli boycott laws in ’95 - that brought a significant 
peace divident to the Jordanian economy) but increased to 4.6% in average the following 
decade (Knowles 2005; Narayan and Smyth 2009) (fluctuations shown in Figure 1). 




Benoit’s (1973, 1978) findings that military expenditure affects positively economic growth in 
LDC sparked the current debate. Dunne (1996) contends that Benoit’s equations, correlations 
and regressions are ad hoc. The improvised nature of these methods forms the basis of much 
of the subsequent criticism levelled at Benoit. Ball (1983) offers a wide-ranging critique of 
Benoit’s work, taking exception to the statistical methods used and the conclusions drawn from 
the data. In order to clarify the milex- economic growth relationship, Ball (1983, 522) calls for 
case studies that are ‘founded on the socio-economic, political, ecological realities of individual 
countries.’ Similarly, Grobar and Porter (1989) consider Benoit’s findings anomalous, noting 
that the majority of subsequent studies find that milex affect negative economic growth.  
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Additionally, several surveys of the literature have been issued, with little agreement as per the 
nature of the milex-growth relationship. Dunne and Uye (2008) survey 102 studies and find 
that, among sixty-two cross-section studies, 19% report a positive relationship, 39% a negative 
relationship and 42% an unclear relationship. The authors contend that the differences are the 
results of the econometric modelling. Mintz and Stevenson (1995) repot a positive relationship 
for 103 countries which was supported by Alptekin and Levine’s (2012). 
Looney and Frederiksen (1986) report also a positive relationship with similar findings by 
Halicioglu (2004) and Tiwari and Shahbaz (2013). Using a Barro-style growth model, 
Dimitraki and Menla -Ali (2015) find a net positive relationship between military expenditure 
and economic growth in China for the period 1950-2011. These studies represent a range of 
theoretical approaches, illustrating that analyses built on different theoretical foundations may 
lead to broadly similar findings. 
Focussing on a similarly large set of developing countries, Deger and Smith (1983) posit that 
there is a negative relationship between milex and economic growth. Similar results were 
supported by Lim (1983) and Faini et al. (1984).  
Moreover, a few studies attempt to focus on smaller groups of countries with shared 
characteristics. Assembling a cluster of thirty-nine similar developing countries, Gyimah-
Brempong (1989) finds that milex does not have any significant direct effects on economic 
growth, but the total effect is strongly negative as milex negatively affects the supply of skilled 
labour. This finding may hold some validity because, despite the country diversity, all nations 
fielding an army divert skilled individuals from the labour force. Focussing on African 
countries, Smaldone (2006) observes that the overall effect of military spending on economic 
growth is rarely noticeable and that in the case of countries experiencing security and economic 
difficulties, a negative relationship is most evident. This finding echoes the conclusions of 
Looney and Frederiksen (1986) and Lebovic and Ishaq (1987).  
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D’Agostino et al. (2013) contend that the omission of endogeneity in the literature may cause 
an underestimation of the damaging effect of milex on economic growth. Abu Bader and Abu 
Qarn (2003) find a negative relationship between military expenditure and growth over time in 
Egypt, Syria and Israel using multivariate cointegration. Studies finding no relationship 
between military expenditure and economic growth betray little consistency in theoretical 
approach or country sample size. One cannot discern from these studies whether the divergence 
is caused by the different econometric models used, but it is also possible that military 
expenditure might have different effects in different time periods (Smith 1977). Aizenman and 
Glick (2006) find that economic growth is generally impeded by higher military spending, 
except in the presence of external threats. This adds credence to the notion that external threats 
are relevant to the military expenditure-growth relationship (see Lebovic and Ishaq 1987).  
A small number of papers explore the milex-growth relationship in Jordan, and most of these 
papers include the country as part of a multi-country cross section. Note that Jordanian data 
plays an important role in Benoit’s seminal studies. Grobar and Porter (1989) contend that 
Benoit’s finding of a positive relationship between military spending and economic growth 
highly dependent on a few observations, and that Taiwan and Jordan strongly influence the 
overall results. Similar results reported by Yildirim et al. (2005) for Middle Eastern countries 
and Turkey. Benoit (1978) argues that countries with high military governments, including 
Jordan, might overstate their growth rates. Notwithstanding Benoit’s (1978) mislabelling of 
Jordan as a ‘military government’ (the nation has been a constitutional monarchy since 
independence from British rule), he claims that exclusion of Jordan, along with Burma and S. 
Vietnam (bona fide military governments in the period under study), does not change his 
results. Lebovic and Ishaq (1987), by focussing on a set of Middle Eastern countries, (and by 
incorporating an index of threat level into their analysis as milex may be simply a response to 
external threats) find that, overall, military burden appears to dampen economic growth in the 
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non-oil exporting Middle Eastern countries9. Similar results reported by Abu-Bader and Abu-
Qarn (2007), Korkmaz (2015), Künü et al. (2016) and Çetin, and Simla (2019). However, 
Rashid and Arif (2012) reported a positive relationship between growth and military spending 
in Jordan. These results were confirmed by Alawin (2013) who reports a significant positive 
relationship on the milex growth nexus for Jordan from 1970-2010.  
To sum up, the prior literature provides only a partial picture of the military expenditure-growth 
relationship in Jordan. Multi-country studies necessarily lack depth at the individual country 
level. Additionally, examination of the previous studies betrays no consistency as to whether 
the relationship in Jordan is positive, negative or not discernible. A study of Jordanian growth 
and military spending at a more granular level and longer period may clarify the nature of the 




This study uses annual time-series data covering a 45-year period from 1970 to 2015, reflecting 
data availability. The following section provides background on the data for each variable in 
the empirical model. The model incorporates variables considered important determinants of 
economic growth in the Barro-type model, where: GDP: Annual rate of gross domestic product 
per capita; MILEX: Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP; GEXP: non-defence 
government expenditure as a percentage of GDP; INV: Government investment as a percentage 
of GDP; POP: Log of total population.  
The data for Jordan’s GDP was sourced from the Central Bank of Jordan; the Military 
expenditure data was sourced from SIPRI; government expenditure was sourced from the 
 
9 Jordan is a member of this group 
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World Bank’s Development Indicators. Population and investment data were sourced from the 
Penn World Tables. Descriptive statistics are in table 2. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 reports a summary of descriptive statistics of the relevant variables: GDP, Milex, 
investment, government expenditure and population. The annual mean of all the variables is 
positive. With regard to volatility, GDP, INV and POP exhibits higher volatility than military 
spending whilst GEXP lower. Furthermore, all the variables exhibit strong kurtosis and 
skewness. The Jarque–Bera (JB) test statistics show that normality is rejected at the 1% level 
for GDP, GEXP and Milex. 
Furthermore, by using both the augmented Dickey–Fuller (Dickey and Fuller 1981) (ADF) and 
Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP) (Panel A and B in table 2) tests, all the variables was found to 
be I(1) (except the GDP which is I(0)) which indicates that they may exhibit some long run 
linear combination, but GDP is integrated at level and justifies the use of ARDL as the series 
are integrated at different levels. The ADF test is sensitive to lag length selection criteria (see 
Hall 1994; Ng and Perron 2001). We use the general-to-specific procedure suggested by Hall 
(1994) for the ADF tests to select the optimal lag lengths of these tests. The extant literature 
on unit root tests further reinforces that such selection criteria provide better power and size 
for the corresponding tests. However, Perron (1989) showed that failure to consider a break in 
a time series produces false results (with the condition of not rejecting a false unit root null 
hypothesis).  
[Table 3 here] 
 
The study period covers 45 years during which both the economic policies and the 
macroeconomic and the political environment in Jordan have changed substantially. All these 
changes likely have caused structural changes in the series. Thus, the Zivot and Andrews 
12 
 
(1992) (ZA) test, with a single endogenous structural break, is also conducted in this paper. 
The endogenous breakpoint in the ZA test is chosen at the value in which a one-sided test 
statistic on the coefficient in the ADF test is minimised (e.g. the most negative value). 
Employing a test that allows for a structural break is likely to be informative, as our long span 
of data contains continuous policy reforms in Jordan during all the decades that we investigate. 
The test results, displayed in Table 2, indicate that all variables are non-stationary in levels, but 
stationary in first differences with the exception of GDP regardless of the inclusion of the 
deterministic time trend. However, the ZA test shows that the variables are stationary with a 
single break and that the breakpoints are significant in all cases (Panel C). 
 
Methodology  
Our model follows the Barro-style10 model of economic growth developed by modifying the 
Barro (1990) model. The Barro-style specification, controls for variation in the size of central 
government (milex and other government expenses) as explanatory variable for economic 
growth. Other control variables are: governmental investment and labour. Furthermore, the 
Gregory -Hansen (1996) cointegration technique will be applied which allows for potential 
breaks in the data flowing by the ARDL methodology. In the following section the Gregory -
Hansen cointegration is explained and applied (in the presence of endogenously determined 
breaks in the system), following by and ARDL methodology to obtain the short and long run 









Gregory –Hansen Methodology 
Perron (1989) notes that ignoring potential structural breaks can extract invalid not only unit 
root results but also those of the cointegration tests. Moreover, Gregory et al. (1996) confirms 
that in the presence of a structural break the ADF test tends to under-reject the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration.  Additionally, in the presence of structural breaks, tests that do not allow 
for them might produce spurious cointegration (Kunitomo 1996). Thus, it is of high importance 
to be aware of the effects of structural breaks11 in the cointegration results as they usually occur 
due to major policy changes or shocks in an economy.  Furthermore, Hendry (1996) argues 
that it is important to distinguish between breaks in the individual variables and breaks in the 
cointegrating vectors. 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) addressed the problem of estimating cointegration relationships in 
the presence of structural breaks. They introduced a residual -based technique to test the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of cointegration in the presence of a 
break. The break point is unknown in this technique and is determined by finding the minimum 
values for the ADF t-statistics or in other words the absolute ADF test statistic is at its 
maximum. By considering the existence of a potential unknown and endogenously determined 
one time break in the system Gregory and Hansen (1996) introduced 4 alternative models. 
 
Model 1: Standard Cointegration 
Yt = μ1 + α1Χt + et                                               (1) 
Model 2: Cointegration with Level12 Shift (C/C)  
Yt = μ1 + μ2φtk + α1Χt + et                                  (2) 
 
11 Any policy evaluation based on conventional methods ignoring the structural break can be grossly misleading.  
12 Level shift means that there is a shift in the constant term of the cointegrating equation. 
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Model 3: Cointegration with Level Shift and Trend (C/T) 
Yt = μ1 + μ2φtk + β1t + α1Χt + et                          (3) 
Model 4: Cointegration with Regime Shift (C/S) 
Yt = μ1 + μ2φtk + α1Χt + α2Χtφtk + et                            (4) 
where: Υ is the dependent variable; Χ is the independent variable; t is time subscript; e is the 
error term; k is the break date and φ is a dummy variable such that: 
     φtk                0   if t ≤k [k is the breaking point] 
                         1   if t >k 
Where the unknown parameter t є (0,1) is defined as the relative time of the change point. 
Gregory and Hansen (1996b) constructed three statistics for those test: ADF*, Ζα* and Ζt*. 
They are corresponding to the traditional ADF test and Phillips type test of unit root on the 
residuals. The null hypothesis of no cointegration with structural breaks is tested against the 
alternative of cointegration by the GH approach. The single break date in these models is 
endogenously determined. They have tabulated critical values by modifying the Mackinnon 
(1991) procedure for testing cointegration in the Engle-Granger method for unknown breaks. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the statistic: ADF*, Ζα* and Ζt* is smaller than the 
corresponding critical value.  Additionally, the null hypothesis of no cointegration with 
structural breaks is tested against the alternative of cointegration by the GH approach. The 
single break date in these models is endogenously determined. The break date is found by 
estimating the cointegration equations for all possible break dates in the sample. We select a 
break date where the test statistic is the minimum or in other words the absolute ADF test 
statistic is at its maximum.  
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This study only considers and applies the model 4-Cointegration with regime shift13 in the case 
of Jordan, that is, a shift in mean and slope coefficients. The empirical results procedure on the 
GH cointegration procedure indicates that the calculated statistic -7,00614 is smaller than its 
respective 5% value -6.40 reported in Gregory and Hansen (1996). This confirms the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative of at least one cointegration 
relationship in the presence of a structural break. The estimated long run relationship using the 
CS is of the form: 
GDP = 2.82 + 1.93MILEX - 1.66POP -0.018INV +0.012GEXP +0.19TREND        (5) 
           (8.64)    (0.97)             (0.006)     (37.90)        (0.25)             (8.64) 
where dummy D = 0 if t ≤ 1989 and D =1 if t ≥ 1989  
[Table 4 here] 
As the results above show the most important structural break in the economy of Jordan as it 
has been endogenously identified by the GH procedure is in 1989 (the break has been 
determined by all variables in the system) which coincides with the financial crisis in 1988-89 
and the beginning of the IMF and World Bank guided economic liberalization program15 and 
its subsequent impact16. Eq 5 further show that milex and GEXP affect positively economic 
growth whilst POP and INV have a negative effect. 
 
The ARDL Cointegration Approach  
The autoregressive distributed lag or ARDL bound test (ARDL hereafter) approach is one of 
the cointegration techniques for determining long term relationships among variables under 
 
13 Gregory and Hansen (1996) found that the power of the conventional ADF test with no allowance for regime 
shifts falls sharply. 
14 The description here is based on the Gregory and Hansen (1996) tables. 
15 See Harrigan et al. (2006) for a detailed discussion of the IMF & World Bank’s liberalization program.  
16 The implementation of the IMF/WB-sponsored economic-adjustment and austerity plan in 1989, had violent 
results with riots across the country. See more in Ryan (1998).  
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study (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997; and Pesaran et al. 2001). The ARDL model is a dynamic 
specification which includes lagged values of the dependent and explanatory variables as well 
as contemporaneous values of explanatory variables to estimate both long and short run 
relations among several variables of interest. The main advantage of ARDL modelling lies in 
its flexibility: it provides better results (performs better) when the sample size T is small (like 
in our case) as compared to traditional approaches to cointegration e.g. Engle and Granger 
(1987); Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Phillips and Hansen (1990) (Haug 2002; Ghatak and 
Siddiki 2001). Also, the unrestricted model of ECM seems to take satisfactory lags that 
captures the data generating process in a general-to-specific framework of specification 
(Laurenceson and Chai, 2003). This method avoids the classification of variables as I (1) and I 
(0) by developing bands of critical values which identifies the variables as being stationary or 
non-stationary processes. Unlike other cointegration techniques (e.g., Johansen’s procedure) 
which entail certain pre-testing for unit roots and that the underlying variables to be integrated 
are the same order, the ARDL model provides an alternative test for examining a long-run 
relationship regardless of whether the underlying variables are purely I(0) or I(1), even 
fractionally integrated. Furthermore, traditional cointegration methods may also suffer from 
the problems of endogeneity while the ARDL method can distinguish dependent and 
explanatory variables. Thus, estimates obtained from the ARDL method are unbiased and 
efficient, since they avoid the problems that may arise in the presence serial correlation and 
endogeneity. The difficulty in determining the order of VAR, optimum number of lags etc. 
found in Johansen cointegration is overcome by ARDL test. Finally, ARDL captures the co-
integrating vector from the multiple co-integrating vectors (Nkoro and Uko 2016; Pesaran et 
al. 2001). 
The ARDL method involves four steps: The first step is to examine the presence of 
cointegration using the bounds testing procedure; The second step is to estimate the coefficients 
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of the long run relationships identified in the first step; The third step is to estimate the short 
run dynamic coefficients; The fourth stage involves testing for the stability of the model, by 
using the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests (Pesaran and Pesaran 1997; Pesaran, et al. 2001). 
According to Pesaran and Pesaran (1997), the ARDL procedure is represented by the following 
equation: 
𝜑 (𝐿, 𝑝) 𝑦𝑡  = ∑   𝛽𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) 𝑥𝑖𝑡 
𝑘
𝑖=1 + 𝛿
′ 𝑤𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡                                        (6) 
Where: 
φ (L,p)yt = 1-φ1L -φ2L
2 -…-φp L
p                                                              (7) 
and  
𝛽𝑖(𝐿, 𝑞𝑖) 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 1 −  𝛽𝑖1𝐿
2 − 𝛽𝑖2 𝐿 − ⋯ − 𝛽𝑖𝑞𝑖𝐿
𝑞𝑖     i=1, 2, …, k             (8) 
Where: yt denotes the dependent variable, xit is the i dependent variables, L is a lag operator 
and wt is the SX1 vector representing the deterministic variables employed, including intercept 
terms, dummy variables, time trends and other exogenous variables. The optimum leg length 
is generally determined by minimizing either the Akaike Information Criterion(AIC) or the 
Schwarz Bayesian Criteria (SBC). Using the ARDL specific model, the long-run coefficients 
and their asymptotic standard errors are then obtained. The long-run elasticity can then be 
estimated as follows: 
θ̂ =  
β̂i0+β̂i1+⋯+β̂qi
1−φ̂1  −φ̂2−⋯−φ̂p
        ∀     i=1,2…, k                                        (9) 
The long run cointegrating vector is then given by: 
𝑦𝑡  − 𝜃0  − 𝜃1𝑥1𝑡 − 𝜃2𝑥2𝑡 − ⋯ − 𝜃𝑘𝑥𝑘𝑡 =  𝑡     ∀ t=1, 2, …, n           (10) 




                   
We can now rearrange equation (6) in terms of the lagged levels and the first differences of 
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yt, x1t, x2t, …, xkt and wt to obtain the short-term dynamics of the ARDL as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = −𝜑(1, ?̂?)𝐸𝐶𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖0 ∆𝑥1𝑡𝛿
′∆𝑤𝑡
𝑘
𝑖=1 − ∑ 𝜑






𝑗=1 ∗ ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡  
(11) 
and finally, one can define the error correction term in the following manner: 
𝐸𝐶𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − ∑ 𝜃𝑖
𝑘
𝑖=1 𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝜓′𝑤𝑡                                                           (12) 
In equation (11) φ *, δ ' and βij are the short-run dynamic coefficients and 𝜑(1, ?̂?) denote the 
speed of adjustment. 
 
Empirical results based on the ARDL approach 
The first step in ARDL approach to cointegration is to estimate the Equation 8 by using OLS 
estimation techniques. The second step is to test the joint hypothesis that the long-run 
multipliers of the lagged level variables are all equal to zero (H0: δ0 = δ1 =. δ2 = δ3 = δ4 
=δ5=δ6 = 0 -eq.13 below), against the alternative that at least one is non-zero using standard 
Wald or F-test statistics. The test for cointegration is provided by two asymptotic critical value 
bounds when the independent variables are either I(0) or I(1). The lower bound assumes all the 
independent variables are I(0), and the upper bound assumes they are I(1). If the test statistics 
exceed their respective upper critical values, the null is rejected and we can conclude that a 
long-run relationship exists. The F-statistics obtained by performing Wald test on the Equation 
11 has a non-standard distribution. The asymptotic critical values of the F-statistics are 
provided by Pesaran et al. (2001). But Narayan (2005), argued that these critical values are 
inappropriate in small samples ranging from 30 to 80 observations. Since our study has 45 
observations, we have used the critical values of Narayan (2005). The results are reported in 
Table 5.  
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[Table 5 here] 
The computed F-statistic is 6.96. As it is larger than the upper bound critical value of 4.450 at 
the 5% level of significance, the null of no cointegration is rejected implying a long-run 
relationship between economic growth and military expenditure.  
Following Pesaran et al. (2001) the error correction representation of the ARDL model is: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑎0 + ∑ 𝑏𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝑐𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−𝑗
𝑛





𝑗=0 + ∑ 𝑓𝑗∆𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡−𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=0 + 𝛿1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1+𝛿2𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 +
𝛿4𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛿5𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛿6𝐷89 + 1𝑡       (13) 
The parameter δi , where i=1,2,3,4,5,6  is the corresponding long-run multipliers, whereas the 
b, c, d, e, and f are the short-run dynamic coefficients of the underlying ARDL model.  
Furthermore, eq. 13 should be estimated (by excluding the ECM term which subsequently will 
be incorporated into the ARDL model) to obtain the long run results. An important issue when 
incorporate the ARDL approach is to choose the order of the distributed lag function. The 
optimal number of lags are (4, 4, 4, 1, 1) and selected based on AIC. The short-run adjustment 
process is then measured by the error correction term ECMt-1 and it shows how quickly 
variables adjust to a shock and return to equilibrium. Table 6 below show the long run and 
short run coefficients of the variables under investigation. The regression results for the short-
run which is presented in Table 6 are consistent with the long run results. The statistical 
significance of the ECMt-1 
17 confirms the presence of long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the variables under study. The estimated coefficient is 0.66 (with the expected negative 
sign implying the existence of short run relationship between explanatory variables) which 
 
17 According to Bannerjee et al. (1998) the ECM coefficient shows how quickly or slowly the variables return to 
the equilibrium path and it should have a significantly negative coefficient. It is also is further proof of the 
existence of a stable long-term relationship.  
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suggests that the deviation from the long-term GDP path is corrected by 66% over the following 
year. This means that the adjustment takes place quite rapidly. 
[Table 6 here] 
The empirical results (Table 6) indicate that both government expansion and milex improve 
economic growth in Jordan on the short and long run. The positive effect of government 
spending (or expansion) confirms the Keynesian18 view that government spending can be 
utilized as a policy instruments that promotes economic growth. These results are consistent 
with Bose et al. (2007) regarding LDC and Dandan (2011) for Jordan among others. On the 
short run economic development is associated with structural changes, and under specific 
institutional settings may add to inequalities and the risk of internal conflict. This situation may 
increase defense budgets to secure peace and stability (Maizels and Nissanke 1986). Regarding 
the short and long run positive effect of milex19 it has been long documented in the literature, 
for LDC especially the ones at a stage of development, where defense spending is seen as a 
social good with positive effects on the economy (e.g. Benoit 1978; Weede 1983; Alexander 
1990; Dimitraki and Menla -Ali 2015; among others). The above can further be explained via 
the capital utilization (an increase in milex results use of unemployed resources, which affects 
growth positively and increasing the strategic reserve of essential commodities), especially 
when an economy is in recession, increased milex can boost the economy (Alptekin and Levine 
2012). Also, according to Yildrim et al. (2005) the armed forces are the instruments to maintain 
political stability. Government expenditure affects positive economic growth via providing 
training, construction, technological and industrial spill-overs that contribute to economic 
growth (productive component of government expenditure). The results are consistent with Al-
 
18 The notion that military expenditure promotes economic growth by stimulating aggregate demand and reducing 
excess capacity.  
19 We have also tested the direction of the relationship between Milex and economic growth, by employing a 
bivariate Granger causality test that proves that military expenditure (granger causes) drives changes on economic 
growth for the period under study but not the other way around. The results are available under request.  
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Bataineh (2012), Dandan (2011), Alawin (2013) and Al-Fawwaz (2015). The negative impact 
of public investment on economic growth is on line with Devarajan, et al. (1996), who argues 
that public investment can have potentially negative effects on economic growth perhaps 
because of inefficient and unproductive nature of such investments, combined with budget 
deficits (Gupta et al. 2005). Additionally, higher government investment might enhance 
macroeconomic uncertainty and hider economic growth on the long run (crowding out effects) 
(Landau 1983). The above is true for Jordan which according to Knowles (2005) has a narrow 
production base, investments in the defence sector, extensive subsidy programs (covering from 
food to infrastructure/housing), investment on consumption of imported goods, and a growing 
external debt (from the mid-80s). Hence, the state was using those expenditure for political 
purposes and for many years with signs of induced state rentierism. Similarly, labour affects 
negatively economic growth on the short run which is consistent with (Dunne, 1996): Jordan 
might attract scarce skilled labour and crowd out resources from the civilian sector. Lastly, 
with the end of the second oil boom (early 1980s), an overall curtailment of economic activity 
in the Gulf countries took place, leading to budgetary cutbacks and consequently reduced 
demand for Jordanian labour (almost 300.000 workers returned to Jordan increasing the 
number of unemployed) and the ones remained suffered cutbacks in salaries. The above 
supports the negative long run effect between public investment and economic growth. 
 
Stability Tests 
This section presents the test for the stability of the of short-run and long-run coefficients 
performing the conventional methods CUSUM (figure 2) and CUSUMQ (figure 3) stability 
tests proposed by Brown et al. (1975) for the AIC-based error correction models. To test for 
stability of coefficients for the indicators under study is important for policy setting. The tests 
applied to the residuals are based on the first set of N observations. It is updated recursively 
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and is plotted against the break point indicate the absence of any instability of the coefficients 
because the plots of the CUSUM (figure 2) and CUSUMQ (figure 3) statistic are confirmed 
within the 5% critical bounds of parameter stability20. 
 
[Figures 2 and 3 here] 
Conclusively, the stability of the parameters remained within its critical bounds of parameter 




The allocations of states’ national income for defence spending attracted a lot of interest the 
last decades, mainly due to the perceived negative implications on private investment and 
domestic savings, and lower consumption due to lower aggregate demand. A reason for such 
controversies in the literature was from identifying milex as non-productive expenditure. From 
the geopolitical point of view, Jordan is within close proximity to major regional conflicts, 
facing internal (e.g. austerity measures and the increasing confidence in the country’s Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafist movements) and external threats (e.g. spillover effects from the civil 
wars from the neighbouring countries such as Syria). Jordan is constantly facing risks of 
possible military entanglement in the border zone, the spread of Salafist radicalisation, the 
heaving cost of sustaining a large refugee population, and the potential interference inside 
Jordan of Islamist movements from other regional countries (Satloff and Schenker 2013). 
Hence, it is inevitable that Jordan requires significant amount of resources allocated to military 
expenditure for internal and external stability. This is because the uncertainty associated with 
an unstable internal environment may reduce investment (unsafe environment for investors) 
 
20  If the plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ statistic stays within a 5% significance level (portrayed by two straight 
lines whose equations are given in Brown et al. (1975), then coefficient estimates are said to be stable.  
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and the overall pace of economic growth. Unlike scholars who claim that military expenditure 
having opportunity costs as it crowds our productive spending (e.g. Smaldone 2006), our 
findings suggest that military expenditure promotes economic growth. This could be attributed 
to the potential spillover effects that it continuously faces due to the political unrests in the 
neighbouring countries e.g. Israel, Syria and Iraq. 
To test the above, this paper uses annual data from 1970 -2015 to endogenously determine the 
most significant and important structural breaks on Jordan’s economic growth. The empirical 
results based on G-H models show that the most significant structural breaks occurring over 
the last five decades and which were detected endogenously, in fact coincide with the 1989 
financial crisis followed by economic structural adjustments. Next, we employed an ARDL 
approach to estimate and validate the long- and short-term determinants of economic growth 
in Jordan. Applying the ECM version of the ARDL model shows that the error correction 
coefficient, which determines the speed of adjustment, has an expected and highly significant 
negative sign. The results indicate that deviation from the long-term growth rate in GDP is 
corrected by approximately 66 percent in the following year. The estimated model passes a 
battery of diagnostic tests and the graphical evidence (CUSUM and CUSUMQ graphs) indicate 
that the model is fairly stable during the sample period. Finally, our results indicate that, on the 
long-term, military expenditure promote economic growth by providing a safe environment for 
investment and a convenient environment for the production process which may lead to attract 
foreign investors.  
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The 10 most militarised countries in the 
Middle East in 2015 
The 10 most militarised countries in the 
World in 2015 
Country GMI score* 
Millions $ 
Rank Country GMI score 
Millions $ 
Rank 
Israel 890.2 1 Israel 890.2 1 
Jordan 808.0 4 Singapore 868.4 2 
Kuwait 772.4 9 Armenia 835.8 3 
Oman 750.9 13 Jordan 808.0 4 
Bahrain 739.4 15 Republic of Kora 801.3 5 
Saudi Arabia 734.6 17 Russia 794.5 6 
Lebanon 727.7 19 Cyprus 794.2 7 
United Arab 
Emirates 
712.8 24 Azerbaijan  786.4 8 
Egypt 705.2 26 Kuwait 772.4 9 
Iran 700.2 27 Greece 771.7 10 
*A more detailed description of the GMI score (which includes indicators such as milex-personnel 
and armaments) can be found at: Grebe, Jan. 2011. “The Global Militarization Index (GMI) – A tool 
for evaluating development orientation of states as well as regional developments.” Occasional 
Paper, February 2011, Bonn: BICC 
Source: Adopted from BICC GMI 2015: Table 1 p. 5 and Table 2 p. 7.  
 
 
                     Table 2: Summary of Descriptive statistics 
 Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis J.B 
GDP 6.01 0.11 0.54 5.77     6.5*** 
Milex  9.0 4.30 0.66 1.84      4.71*** 
INV 38.73 9.14 0.22 2.28        1.09 
GEXP 1.64 1.58 1.13 3.15       7.93*** 
POP 39925 14842 0.19 1.81 2.38 
 








                                    TABLE  3:  Unit Root Test Results  
 
     GDP    MILEX    INV      POP GE 
Panel A: ADF Tests 
     
Levels  -3.51(4) *** -1.24(0)   -1.57(2)     1.12(0)  4.67(1) 
 -3.69(4) *** -2.36(0)   -2.40(2)    -2.13(0) 
 1.61(1) 
1st dif   -7.42(4)***  -5.50(1)***   -3.75(4)*** -8.86(0)
*** 
  -7.40(4)***  -5.41(1)***   -3.67(4)*** -6.30(0)
*** 
Panel B: PP Tests      
Levels  -5.20*** -0.96   -1.70         0.84   4.54 
 -3.62*** -2.31   -2.59       -2.29   0.85 
1st dif   -8.52***   -5.51***       -2.83***  -6.30
*** 
  -16.72***   -5.42***       -4.33***  -8.86
*** 
Panel C: ZA Tests      














       
 
Notes: The proper lag length, allowing for a maximum of five lags, is on the basis of the general-to-specific 
approach for the ADF test, represented in parentheses (.).*** and ** indicate statistical significance at the 1% 
and 5% significance levels, respectively. The estimated breakpoints (𝑇𝐵) for the ZA test are in square 
brackets [.] with s indicating that the identified breakpoint is significant at the 5% level 
 
 
TABLE  4:  Gregory Hansen Cointegration Test: MODEL 4: Regime Shift 
Dependent Variable Model Test Statistic Break Point 
GDP C/S -7.006* 1989 
Notes: C/S denotes regime shift. The lag length is chosen based on minimum SC.* denotes 















TABLE  5:  Critical Value bounds of F statistics: Intercept and no trend,  
45 observations, k=4 
T 90% level 95% level 9% level 
45 I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
 2.638 3.772 3.178 4.450 4.394 5.914 
Calculated F statistics Period 1970- 2015 
45                                                     6.96 
Critical values are extracted from Table in Narayan (2005), p. 1988, Case: III. 
 
 
TABLE 6: The estimated long-run & short run ECM 
ARDL (4, 4, 4, 1, 1): Dependent: LGDP ECM-ARDL: Dependent: ΔLGDS 
Variables    
























ECM t−1  -0.66*** 
(-13.60) 
Notes: t-statistic in parentheses; ***,** ,* denote statistical significance at 5%, 10% and 1% 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
